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Abstract
Liberal democratic norms are embodied in refugee camps 
and the states that host them in a multitude of ways: 
through refugee law and the ‘good offi  ces’ of the United 
Nations; in relation to international aid and the prerequi-
sites recipient governments must meet to receive it; and in 
refugee education to name but a few. In the Dadaab camps 
of Northeast Kenya, democracy and law meet intense geo-
political pressures. Th e camps are situated in what was 
once contested territory during the period of colonial rule. 
In the early 1990s and again in 2011, as Somalia faced 
armed confl ict and related famine, thousands of refugees 
fl ed to the Dadaab camps. Th e presence of Somali refugees 
in Kenya is not politically neutral or merely humanitarian. 
Th e contradictions between liberal democratic norms and 
the prevailing geopolitical sentiments that favour keep-
ing refugees in camps them are explored in the context of 
Dadaab.
Résumé
Des normes démocratiques libérales sont appliquées dans 
les camps de réfugiés et les États qui accueillent ces camps 
le font de plusieurs façons : par des lois sur les réfugiés et 
les bons offi  ces des Nations Unies, par l’aide internationale 
donnée aux États sous certaines conditions, et à travers 
l’éducation auprès des réfugiés, pour n’en nommer que 
quelques unes. Dans les camps de Dadaab, dans le nord-
est du Kenya, la démocratie et la loi subissent des pressions 
géopolitiques intenses. Ces camps sont situés dans un ter-
ritoire autrefois contesté pendant la période coloniale. Au 
début des années 1990 et de nouveau en 2011, des milliers 
de réfugiés ont fui vers les camps de Dadaab, suite au 
confl it armé en Somalie et à la famine qui en a découlé. 
La présence de réfugiés somaliens au Kenya n’est pas une 
situation politiquement neutre ou simplement humani-
taire. Les contradictions apparaissant entre les normes 
démocratiques libérales et les sentiments géopolitiques pré-
dominants en faveur de garder ces réfugiés dans les camps, 
font l’objet de cet article, dans le contexte des camps de 
Dadaab.
Introduction
As a fi eld of inquiry, ‘refugee studies’ is remarkably apolitical 
given the dramatic human displacement across borders that 
geopolitics generates. Confl ict in and displacement from 
Somalia today, for example, are imbued with legacies of the 
Cold War, as weapons left  behind by allies from the USSR 
and later from the US can still be found in use. Th e Dadaab 
camps of Northeast Kenya are located in what was once 
contested territory between Somalia and Kenya during the 
period of colonial rule. Th e refugees’ presence in the region 
today is not politically neutral or merely humanitarian.
Herein lies the conundrum; others might call it a con-
tradiction, or more simply geopolitics. Most of the world’s 
states have signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol that extends its temporal 
and geographical mandate, yet the wealthiest of these have 
found ways to duck many of the legal obligations outlined 
therein. Th is same Convention also outlines certain rights 
to education that refugees shall have. In short, liberal demo-
cratic norms and human rights might appear to ensure the 
provision of protection and education to refugees, but the 
actual aid, policies and strategies of these liberal demo-
cratic governments do not always correspond to these legal 
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obligations and democratic norms. Instead, refugees are 
managed in situ, stuck in legal limbo without most of the 
basic human rights to mobility, work, and residence. While 
non-refoulement, or protection from forced return to a dan-
gerous country of origin, remains intact, refugees in Kenyan 
camps live with long term uncertainty, with their mobility, 
employment prospects, and legal status restricted.
Th is short paper makes three related points that advance 
this argument. First, I outline how refugee camps themselves 
are geopolitical formations and are in no way immune or 
irrelevant to geopolitics, whether regional or international. 
Th en I draw on research to show how Somali refugees in 
the Dadaab camps of Kenya are managed in place, with 
little concern for the ongoing suspension of livelihoods and 
human development.1 Finally, based on the fi rst two points, 
I elucidate the hypocrisy of the long term camp situation in 
a context where international aid to refugee-hosting coun-
tries is conditional upon democratic reform, ‘good govern-
ance’, and other liberal norms that value civil society that 
are completely ignored in the context of the camps. One 
expression of this dark irony is refugee education in the 
camps. To conclude, then, I off er evidence of refugee educa-
tion in the Dadaab camps as an expression of liberal demo-
cratic norms in a place where such norms are largely being 
ignored or neglected in relation to the protracted refugee 
population.
Th e Geopolitics of Humanitarian Space
Th e Horn of Africa, including East Africa, has been a stra-
tegic space subject to foreign infl uence during colonial, Cold 
War, and postcolonial periods, including the contemporary 
one. European powers staked their claims in the Horn of 
Africa beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
notoriously drawing international borders through single 
ethnic and linguistic groups and destabilizing the region 
in the process. In the contemporary moment, the people at 
whom humanitarian assistance is targeted are largely found 
in poorer, formerly colonized countries of the geopolitical 
‘Th ird World’, those states of the Non-aligned Movement 
that chose to side neither with the First World capitalists 
or the Second World communists. More than 80% of refu-
gees today live in the global South, with a large number of 
those in Sub-Saharan (and increasingly North) Africa.2 Th e 
huge fl ow of humanitarian capital into Africa—in the form 
of peacekeeping and refugee relief—is far more impressive 
than the number of refugees and displaced persons who are 
allowed to leave.3
Th is section of the paper briefl y examines relevant col-
onial, Cold War, and post-Cold War investments in the 
Horn of Africa. It highlights the relationship of colonizer to 
colony as this was superimposed upon nationalist claims for 
an ethnonational state during the period of independence, 
followed by fl ows of money and arms from superpowers 
to countries in the Horn during the Cold War. My analy-
sis aims to highlight how politically charged humanitarian 
spaces can be, and provides a context for the current round 
of humanitarian crisis that besets this region today.
Th e borders that produce refugees and circumscribe their 
movement in East Africa and the Horn today are predicated 
on colonial and Cold War political geographies. Th e estab-
lishment of borders during the colonial period was rein-
scribed by infusions of arms and other investments dur-
ing the period of superpower rivalry. Today these borders 
continue to be reinforced by the large, and no less political, 
fl ows of humanitarian assistance.4 Today, the fl ow of ‘First 
World’ resources into the region continues, albeit to serve 
ostensibly humanitarian rather than colonial or superpower 
interests. Th e relative immobility of refugees to leave the 
region has been juxtaposed with the hypermobility of donor 
capital to the region.5 More recently, notable funds have 
been made available by governments in the global North 
to develop tactics to keep prima facie refugees in ‘regions 
of origin’ and prevent asylum seekers from entering their 
territory.
Drawing the Line, Dividing the Nation: Kenya and 
Somalia
Most Somalis in Kenya live in Northeastern Province, along 
the Kenyan-Somalia border, a region formerly known as the 
Northern Frontier District (NFD). Th e territorial diff erence 
between the Somali nation, as the variegated ethno-national 
group of all Somali people in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, and 
the Somalian nation-state has been a major source of geo-
political confl ict in the region throughout colonial, Cold 
War, and contemporary periods.
Th e Government of Kenya (GOK) has not hidden its 
disdain for Somali refugees living in Kenya, or for its own 
Kenyan nationals of Somali ethnicity. Racism and dis-
crimination against Somalis are practiced today just as 
they were during the colonial period in which Britain ruled 
Kenya and Northern Somalia, France controlled Djibouti, 
and Italy occupied Southern Somalia. While the fi rst col-
onial powers in the Horn exercised only a maritime pres-
ence, the ‘scramble for empire’ among European nations 
in the late nineteenth century accelerated the process of 
colonial partition. Unsurprisingly, many borders in Africa 
were drawn with European interests rather than indigen-
ous settlement patterns or local politics in mind. Confl ict 
over the Kenya-Somalia border can be traced back to col-
onial occupation at the turn of the century when Britain 
extended control over the semi-arid region now known as 
the Northeast Province of Kenya.6
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Th e British colonial administration wanted to establish a 
‘buff er zone’ between its borders with Ethiopia and Italian 
Somaliland (now Somalia) on one side and its railway and 
white settler population on the other.7 Accordingly, admin-
istrative boundaries were redrawn within Kenya, creating 
the Northern Frontier District. Th e ‘frontier’ in the district’s 
name was elucidated in 1909 when Somalis living in Kenya 
were prohibited from crossing the Somali-Galla line that 
divided the NFD from the rest of Kenya. Th is early eff ort 
to contain Somalis in Northeast Kenya led to strategies by 
subsequent governments to curtail the mobility of Somali 
Kenyans in relation to other Kenyan nationals.8 Today, while 
Kenyan Somalis are no longer subject to such discriminatory 
restrictions, all refugees (most of who are from Somalia) in 
the Dadaab camps, which are located in this same part of 
Kenya, are required to stay in the camps.
Th e 1909 policy generated signifi cant resistance to col-
onial rule on the part of Somalis. In response, the British 
administration—by means of legal ordinance—declared 
the NFD a closed district in 1926, a move which aff orded 
it broad powers to sweep the Somali problem behind the 
line, as it were, using whatever force was necessary. A sub-
sequent legal ordinance designated the NFD a ‘Special 
District’ that required its Somali inhabitants to carry passes 
or seek approval from authorities to enter other districts. 
Little attempt was made by the colonial administration 
neither to promote neither social nor economic activities 
in the district nor to integrate it politically with the rest of 
Kenya. Th is geographical and socio-economic segregation 
continued even aft er Kenya achieved independence. Today, 
this part of the country remains distinctly poorer and less 
politically powerful compared to the rest of Kenya.
In 1960, British Somaliland, located in the northern part 
of the emerging country, united with Italian Somaliland 
in the South to form the independent Somalian Republic. 
Despite the formation of this new state, many Somalis 
remained outside its borders in the Ogaden region of 
Ethiopia and in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. 
Ethnic nationalism and the quest for the unifi cation of the 
pan-Somali nation under the leadership of the new govern-
ment of the Republic of Somalia intensifi ed the struggle 
for self-determination among Somalis in Kenya, whose 
persistent political eff orts succeeded in pushing the British 
Colonial Secretary to call for a commission that would 
determine the public opinion of the NFD. A United Nations 
Commission was then appointed to consult residents of the 
area and to make recommendations accordingly.9
Th e Commission found that ethnic Somalis in Kenya 
overwhelmingly preferred unifi cation with the Somalia 
Republic to their political status as part of Kenya. Th e 
British colonial administration was, however, also in the 
process of negotiating Kenyan independence at the time 
with president-to-be, Jomo Kenyatta. During these talks, 
Kenyatta made it clear that he refused to cede Kenyan 
Somaliland to its neighboring republic. Th e British admin-
istration decided to placate Kenyatta by quickly writing 
its own Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission, a 
paper that recommended its preferred course of action 
and reneged on its promise to follow through with the UN 
Commission’s recommendations.10
When this decision was announced, the Somalian 
Republic severed its diplomatic ties with Britain and 
mounted an insurrection in Northeast Kenya which 
became known as the ‘Shift a War.’ Shift as were, and still 
are, defi ned as bandits. Bandit activity is related to the sys-
tematic economic marginalization of ethnic Somalis living 
in this region of Kenya, the Northeast Province of Kenya 
being one of the poorest regions in the country. By relegat-
ing resistance in the area to mere regional ‘banditry’, the 
British administration tried to undermine the political 
legitimacy of Somali actions. In eff orts to counter resistance, 
the colonial administration of the day declared a ‘state-of-
emergency’ in the district in March 1963. Immediately 
aft er Kenya’s independence in December 1963, the newly 
independent Kenyan government also declared a state-
of-emergency in the Northeastern Province and held the 
Somalian government responsible for rebel activity in the 
region.11
Aft er Kenyan independence, the political struggle for 
the unifi cation of a Somali nation continued at regional 
and continental levels. Somalia looked for support from 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, 
but found none. While the OAU admitted that the borders 
of post-independent African states were artifi cial, it was 
committed to territorial integrity and the survival of these 
borders as a practical compromise to achieve peace among 
African states. Between 1964 and 1967, reports suggest that 
some 2,000 Somalis were killed by Kenyan security forces.12 
Th e position of the Government of Kenya, which vowed not 
to cede any ground to Somalia, had very material implica-
tions for Kenyan Somalis. In the struggle to gain independ-
ence from colonialism, the new Kenyan government was 
complicit and reinscribed the colonization of the Northern 
Frontier District. Soon aft er, expelling inhabitants of the 
area became a means of addressing Somali resistance and 
rectifying insecurity in the region. Although the Republic 
of Somalia formally renounced its claim on the Northeast 
Province in 1967, the state-of-emergency policy remained 
in eff ect in the region until 1991.
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Th e Militarization of the Border Area: Now and Th en
Th e militarization of both countries through this period is 
worthy of its own study, yet both this story and the history 
of confl ict in Kenya’s Northeast Province point to the area 
as one that is hardly neutral, despite its humanitarian and 
refugee camp monikers. Th is point has been highlighted 
throughout the fall of 2011, as insecurity became a feature 
of the Dadaab camps themselves. In October, two Spanish 
doctors working for Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) were 
abducted in the camps.13 Th eir kidnapping remains a mys-
tery at the time of writing, and many more security inci-
dents targeted at Kenyan police in and around the camps 
have undermined security, inculcating ‘banditry’ of a new 
order.
Returning to the summer of 1992, the confl uence of 
drought and confl ict in Somalia led to acute famine and 
displacement both within the country and beyond its bor-
ders. Widespread famine and the collapse of the Somalian 
state exacerbated this situation in which an estimated 
500,000 Somali citizens died. Well over a million Somalians 
were internally displaced and some 600,000 fl ed the coun-
try, many of them seeking asylum in nearby Kenya. While 
they were not warmly welcomed, the Kenyan government 
was obliged to tolerate them, partly because of its com-
mitment in international law to the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees as well as 
the 1969 OAU Convention, and partly because it needed the 
continued support through foreign aid of donor countries—
many of which had suspended funds to Kenya at that time.
While donor countries awaited a satisfactory outcome of 
the country’s fi rst multi-party elections before reconsidering 
their aid commitment to Kenya, then President Daniel Arap 
Moi grudgingly allowed Somali refugees into Kenya on the 
condition that they reside only in the camps located near 
the border. Continued provisions of international develop-
ment aid from Europe and North America to Kenya were 
conditional upon a proven commitment to democratic 
process and the country’s acceptance of Somalis in need of 
humanitarian assistance, some of which would also benefi t 
Kenya. During the Moi era in Kenya, a repeating pattern of 
events is discerned by analyst, Daniel Ehrenfeld who calls it 
“a sort of ‘aid tango’.” “First, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of 
foreign aid, and then the government begins to misbehave, 
backtracking on economic reform and fl exing its authori-
tarian muscle. Sharp rebukes this, following which Kenya 
placates its benefactors and the aid is pledged anew.”14
Th e recent humanitarian crisis in Somalia and neigh-
bouring countries is a déjà vu: confl ict and drought together 
precipitate new expressions of human displacement, with 
many people travelling to the Dadaab camps for food. Th e 
Dadaab refugee population grew from 308,784 in January 
2011 to 463,602 in October 2011, an increase of more than 
50% in less than a year. Th is resulted in an increase from 
three camps to six, though the latter were approved by the 
Government of Kenya (GOK) for refugee residence in late 
2011. As with shelter, unfortunately, other infrastructure 
in health and water/sanitation has not kept pace with this 
growth.15 Like the early 1990s, confl ict and drought have 
occurred together as a ‘dual disaster’, generating new waves 
of human displacement within Somalia and across both the 
Ethiopian and Kenyan borders with Somalia.16
Conditioning Aid and Crisis in Somalia and Kenya Today
In 2011, confl ict continues between the African Union 
troops who support the Western-backed government and 
Al-Shabab (more precisely HSM, Harakat Al-Shabaab al-
Mujahideen), a youth movement of Islamist militants who 
aim to overthrow this fragile government.17 Drought has 
returned to the region, and is said to be the worst in sixty 
years. Some 3.2 million people in Somalia face starvation 
and many are inaccessible to humanitarian actors due to 
the actions of Al-Shabab.18
Th e Al-Shabab insurgency has reportedly ‘leaked’ into 
the Dadaab camps. Bulletins that Al-Shabab sympathiz-
ers are among the new arrivals of refugees are not uncom-
mon among those refugees who live in the three original 
camps.19 Whether the kidnapping of the two Spanish 
doctors is an act tied to Al-Shabab or represents a kind of 
piracy that seeks ransom rather than political revenge for 
Kenyan military incursions remains unclear, yet many 
subsequent security incidents aimed at infl icting harm on 
Kenyan security forces suggest that Al-Shabab is present. In 
retaliation for Kenyan military incursions into Somalia in 
fall 2011, Al-Shabab made a public statement that Kenyans 
would pay for their violation of sovereignty and violence 
against Somalia.20
Th e capacity of communities to cope with such distress 
and dual humanitarian crises is no doubt eroded by the fact 
that the displacement from previous rounds of confl ict and 
environmental disaster has not been resolved. Chronic con-
fl ict over two decades and repeated drought has taken a ter-
rible toll on the livelihoods and security of people in East 
Africa and the Horn.
Somalia’s weak Transitional Federal Government, the 
Obama administration, and the United Nations have all 
blamed the anti-government group Al-Shabab for restricting 
international aid operations in the areas they control and 
preventing emergency food distribution. Al Jazeera reports 
that US policy on aid distribution has also contributed 
a drought and food crisis.21 While Al-Shabab has proven 
obstructionist in preventing the delivery of humanitarian 
aid to Somali citizens in dire need, it has produced evidence 
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that the U.S. government has implemented its own condi-
tions on the delivery of food aid to starving people.
Aid organizations in Somalia face strict regulations of 
food distribution in an eff ort to deprive Al-Shabab of food 
for its own forces. While famine conditions were known to 
be coming to South Central Somalia in the fall of 2011, no 
food aid was prepositioned there, despite such a strategy 
being used in other parts of the country, due to the strength 
and control of Al-Shabab, according to Tony Burns, direc-
tor of a Somali NGO called SAACID.22 Th e United States 
Offi  ce of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) monitors US food 
aid distributions in Somalia and elsewhere. OFAC imposed 
sanctions in Somalia to ensure that no material support, 
including food aid, would go to Al-Shabab to support its 
rebel activities. Accountability requirements for food distri-
butions were so stringent that such recordkeeping was hard 
to manage outside of the capital, Mogadishu. Eff ectively, 
the OFAC rules were eventually loosened but not before 
many lives were lost. Th e main point here is that access to 
life-saving food aid was obstructed by Al-Shabab, but that 
securitizing emergency food for famine relief in policy can 
have an adverse impact on civilians. Humanitarian aid is 
supposed to be provided to support the right to life uncon-
ditionally, according the Sphere principles.23
As I have argued elsewhere, humanitarian assistance 
in general has become a de facto political tool through 
which the threat to world stability and resources repre-
sented by poor countries may be defused by development.24 
Conditions placed on international aid are nothing new 
in development circles, but the more recent mantra of ‘aid 
eff ectiveness’ is particularly pernicious, given its broadly 
interpreted liberal democratic requirements of political and 
economic governance. Identifi ed fi rst by the Organization 
for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and promoted by the World Bank, ‘strengthening aid eff ect-
iveness’ is a salient neoliberal policy of development that 
aims to utilize international assistance most effi  ciently by 
eliminating countries with protectionist economic poli-
cies or corrupt, unstable governments from the aid recipi-
ent list.25 ‘Good governance’ and ‘sound economic policy’ 
are prerequisites for receiving international aid under this 
policy rubric.26
In theory, ‘strengthening aid eff ectiveness’ provides aid 
to the ‘good’ low-income developing countries that demon-
strate market-orientated economic provisions and the rule 
of law, including a solid record of democracy and human 
rights, as well as low levels of corruption. Yet even if recipi-
ent governments do abide by the rules of donors from 
the global North, it has become apparent that states who 
donate funds to this region, both Somalia and the refu-
gee camps in Kenya, do not hold themselves to the same 
standards of liberal democratic process, a point I return to 
in the conclusion.
A Silent Emergency: Containing Displacement in 
Camps
Despite the acute current humanitarian crises, few refu-
gees fl eeing Somalia for Kenya or Ethiopia will get beyond 
the camps in these initial countries of asylum, or will get 
Convention refugee status in Kenya or another country of 
asylum. Convention refugee status is a legal designation 
that allows refugees who are determined as bona fi de to 
work and provides them with certain protection guarantees 
when residing in a host country.
Even refugees who arrived in Kenya in the early 1990s 
have not been aff orded this status, as the Government of 
Kenya stopped granting such status at that time, despite 
being a signatory to the Convention. Instead, Kenya 
chooses to let them stay under a group designation with 
many fewer rights, as prima facie, refugees. In the Kenyan 
government’s defense, why should it resettle and integrate 
hundreds of thousands of refugees when Kenya itself is a 
relatively poor country that struggles to educate and employ 
its own nationals?
In the short term, emergency humanitarian assistance is 
being provided to people inside Somalia and to new arriv-
als in desperate condition at the Dadaab camps. Th is will 
avert some death and suff ering, and hopefully save lives. 
And yet just as the Northern Frontier District boundary and 
the Somali-Galla line it imputed kept Somalis contained in 
the district during colonial times, so too have refugees been 
sequestered in this impoverished and arid part of Kenya 
since their displacement from Somali in the years following 
the 1991 coup in Somalia.
Refugees in limbo in Dadaab face a long wait in pro-
tracted situations. Many if not most of their basic human 
rights are neglected, or ignored, but not by any one party, 
government, or force majeur. Instead, they receive min-
imal material provisions to keep them alive, housed, and in 
basic health. Refugee protection against refoulement may be 
guaranteed, but legal protection and pathways to some kind 
of status remain elusive for most.27 In Kenya, basic educa-
tion up to the secondary level is provided, but the highest 
level available is not considered comparable to the Kenyan 
secondary school standard. Access to employment and 
mobility are suspended for years, even decades.
In the context of the three Kenyan camps adjacent to 
Dadaab, some refugees have lived there since the opening of 
the fi rst camp, Ifo refugee camp, in 1992. In the mid-1990s, 
off ering education beyond the primary level was thought to 
be an incentive for refugees to stay in the camps and avoid 
repatriation. Sixty percent of the refugees in Dadaab camps 
 A Refugee Camp Conundrum 
11
are poor or destitute and oft en “unable to meet their daily 
needs.”28
Refugee camps are always only supposed to be ‘stopgap 
measures’, but they have proven to be persistent. Th e aver-
age waiting time for refugees has increased from nine years 
in 1993 to 17 years in 2003.29 Th e liberal democratic val-
ues of post-WWII planning gave rise to the international 
refugee regime, both the legal instruments and the Offi  ce of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. And 
yet neither envisioned the protracted and long term camps 
where most human rights are, in fact, suspended until a 
more durable solution is found.30
Th e United States Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants (USCRI) calls this ‘refugee warehousing’ and 
has launched a tireless campaign on behalf of these refugees 
for the better part of a decade.31 UNHCR reports that almost 
two-thirds of all refugees are in protracted refugee situa-
tions (PRS).32 Bailey et al. chronicle the case of Salvadoran 
asylum seekers in the US who have also remained in legal 
limbo for decades, calling their uncertainty and precar-
ious legal status ‘permanent temporariness’, an apt term for 
people with prima facie group designation as refugees but 
without documentation or individual legal status to resume 
their lives.33
Externalizing Asylum: Providing Protection Off shore
Inasmuch as refugees lack basic human rights in long term 
camps, the donor states of the global North that support the 
food, medical, and housing assistance also actively deter 
asylum seekers from such camps from coming to their bor-
ders to make a refugee claim in a place where more rights 
might be available. Much has been written about the tactics 
used to deter asylum seekers from Europe, North America, 
and Australia, but rarely are these geopolitical practices 
brought to bear on protracted refugee situations such as 
those in East Africa and the Horn.34 Visas, readmission 
agreements and safe third country agreements are just a few 
examples of ways of keeping asylum seekers out and pre-
venting them from making claims.
Asylum has been respatialized, by which I mean that the 
geopolitical valence of refugees has changed since the Cold 
War, resulting in eff orts to assist refugees closer to their 
homes in ‘regions of origin’. Th is occurred fi rst in the early 
1990s through a policy of ‘preventive protection’ and then in 
the 2000s through the externalization of asylum.35 Andrew 
Shacknove presciently signalled a diminished commitment 
to asylum aft er the Cold War ended, noting that “refugee 
policy has always been at least one part State interest and 
at most one part compassion.”36 Th e development of laws, 
policies, and practices to prevent asylum from being sought 
in the global North, thus, continues.
Th e principal architects of the externalization agenda 
are the European Commission, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and Britain.37 Alexander Betts traces how a political space 
for special agreements on the secondary movement of 
refugees and asylum seekers was created by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers through the 
‘Convention Plus’ initiative in 2002.38 Th e initiative aimed 
to provide a space that enhanced refugee protection ‘in the 
region,’ but simultaneously limited access to protection on 
European soil. As,
Th is is not simply a case of placing police and customs offi  cials 
in third country airports—as Zolberg so cogently points out, but 
rather the gradual implementation of a system of migration man-
agement aligned with development assistance in third countries.39
Cooperation by transit countries and states of migrant 
origin is rewarded handsomely with development assist-
ance from more affl  uent countries. Australia patronized 
Indonesia; Italy patronized Libya, until the Arab spring cre-
ated new and unstable political relations there in the spring 
of 2011.
In the early 2000s, UNHCR’s ‘Convention Plus’ initiative 
promoted the local integration of refugees in countries near 
their homes as a durable solution to long-term displacement, 
including those in protracted situations. Yet this approach 
assumed that countries in the global South would be willing 
to take on additional responsibility for integrating refugees 
permanently, given the right mix of foreign aid and other 
fi nancial incentives. It assumed that strengthening capacity 
to protect refugees in these initial countries of asylum could 
reduce the need for onward movement [to the global North] 
for refugees.
Yet, if “African states were to reduce their commitment 
to the principle of territorial asylum, thereby undermining 
access to eff ective refugee protection within the region, this 
would almost certainly exacerbate the likelihood of onward 
movement and global insecurity.”40 Th e authors observe 
that European states are willing to pay for, but not host refu-
gees; these states’ collective views are encapsulated in the 
conviction that “it doesn’t matter where asylum is provided 
as long as it is provided.”41 Th e ‘Convention Plus’ initiative 
failed in its eff orts to persuade fi rst countries of asylum to 
settle refugees permanently, but one could argue that gov-
ernments that are signatories to the Convention have suc-
ceeded in externalizing asylum off shore, away from their 
territory where asylum seekers can access rights once they 
land and fi le a claim. Protracted refugee camps are one 
symptom of these geopolitical tactics.
Th e war in Somalia continues in fi ts and starts, preclud-
ing any possibility for large-scale return. Th e Government 
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of Kenya will not consider local integration for Somali 
refugees, or any other refugees for that matter. Th e recent 
political violence and loss of life in Kenya in addition to 
the long history of ethnonational politics and confl ict in 
Kenya’s northeast do not make it a palatable place for such 
refugees to live in the long term. Currently, their status is 
temporary and their mobility is constrained. While camp 
borders are porous to an extent, they cannot offi  cially leave 
the camps. Th ey do have legal status to live in Kenya beyond 
the humanitarian structures of Dadaab.
Global Education, Local Limitations
Th e region’s political backdrop is layered, from the col-
onial transition to independence to the Cold War and now 
humanitarian aid. Th e fi ne line between lifesaving humani-
tarian aid and refugee protection in the full legal sense is 
blurred at best. Refugee education is controversial in the 
camps to the extent that it is not needed for survival and 
therefore not pertinent to humanitarian operations. Yet 
for refugees stuck in the ‘stopgap-measure-camps’, refugee 
education is essential and codifi ed in international refugee 
law. It is part of the liberal democratic discourse of rights. 
As Assistant UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Erika 
Feller, recently recounted:
Education is one of the highest priorities of refugees, and has a 
vital role to play in their protection and ability to fi nd sustainable 
solutions. Access to education is, though, limited. Refugee enrol-
ment in primary school is only 76 per cent globally and drops to 
36 per cent at secondary level. Girls are at a particular disadvan-
tage. In East Africa and the Horn, for example, only fi ve girls are 
enrolled for every 10 boys.42
Education has been declared a ‘tool of protection’ by 
UNHCR and a durable solution for refugees by scholars 
of ‘education in emergencies’ (EIE).43 According to article 
22 of the 1951 Convention, signatory states “shall accord 
to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals 
with respect to elementary education….  [and] treatment 
as favourable as possible … with respect to education other 
than elementary education.”44
Just as refugee education is a right, it is also a develop-
ment tool. It can also be construed as a protection tool if 
host governments are willing to settle permanently refu-
gees with education and skills over those without. Most 
persuasively, refugee education is a portable skill set that is 
transferable with the person who obtains it, following them 
wherever they may go.
Refugee education is also a resource in developing coun-
tries. Educational services for refugees may exceed the qual-
ity and quantity of education off ered to the local population 
or adjacent countries that have experienced chronic confl ict. 
I draw here on the work of Epstein who speaks of “the edu-
cation refugee”, specifi cally “those who have the means to 
seek asylum across frontiers in order to access an educa-
tion not otherwise available.”45 Epstein provides evidence of 
such migrations from Sudan to Kenya, foregrounding the 
case of South Sudanese children who grew up in chronic 
conditions of war, where education was provided sporadic-
ally, if at all.
In a context where families and communities are oft en divided 
or dispersed by the upheaval of confl ict, schools are seen as key 
institutions that will play the major role in rebuilding core values, 
in instilling new democratic principles, and in helping children 
recover a lost childhood.46
What is most relevant for my argument here is Epstein’s 
fi nding that the curriculum of refugee education in the 
Kenyan context for Sudanese refugees accentuated liberal 
democratic values. Th e curriculum in camp schools over-
seen by UNHCR in Kenya stood in contradistinction to that 
of Khartoum schools where Islamifi cation and Arabization 
agendas prevailed.47 Epstein describes one of the students 
from Sudan who travelled to the Kakuma refugee camp in 
Northern Kenya for his First World infl uenced education:
Seven years aft er reaching Kakuma and enrolling in school, join-
ing the Boy Scouts, performing AIDS awareness skits in drama 
club, making videos about the drawbacks of polygamy and alco-
holism in fi lm club, working in a video hall where tickets were sold 
to view screenings of Chuck Norris movies, and being elected as a 
youth representative to the camp management council, Bol, now 
22 years old and with a high school diploma in hand, returned to 
his village. He quickly found a job as a primary school teacher in 
a private school funded by a former neighbor who now lives in 
the United States, and as an agricultural project manager with a 
international non‐governmental organization (INGO).48
Th e values of the Boy Scouts, the rights of persons with 
HIV/AIDS, the cultural politics of polygamy and alcoholism, 
and the experience with democratic process and representa-
tion are all part and parcel of a liberal democratic state with 
a functioning government to protect individual and group 
rights. National curriculum is also integrated into Kenyan 
refugee camps, so to argue that refugee education is simply 
a ‘Western import’ is to overstate the case.
Yet the vast majority of refugees in Kenyan camps are 
Somalis who cannot go home. Th ey have none of the legal 
status, rights, or entitlements that are codifi ed in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, endorsed and 
signed by the vast majority of countries in the global North. 
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Ironically, the international refugee regime has largely 
failed to deliver much more than survival aid in protracted 
refugee situations, such as this one.49 My point is that these 
refugees experience little of the liberal democracy and 
rights in the curriculum taught in camp schools, despite 
talk of civil society, liberal peace, and human rights. In the 
Dadaab camps, a minimal form of protection from refoule-
ment (forced return) is provided, but without any solution 
to this supposedly temporary situation.
Concluding questions for further thought
Refugee students may be taught to be global citizens: to 
value human rights in the context of liberal democracies, 
and to work in the spirit of voluntarism to benefi t those 
less fortunate then they are, only to personally experience 
containment in camps. In the camps, their own educa-
tional and vocational pursuits are truncated, and a sense of 
‘permanent temporariness’ prevails, not to mention desper-
ation and depression.50 Th ey are taught civics and the sub-
stance of what it means to be a good liberal subject, and yet 
are denied access to these most basic concepts and human 
rights in the context of the camps.
I have argued here that refugee camps are anything but 
neutral, purely humanitarian spaces. In East Africa and 
the Horn, they exist in contested territory with long hist-
ories of geopolitical disputes. Th e Cold War and the rising 
prominence of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
aft er World War II led to the dominance of human rights 
that embodies freedom of expression, movement, and 
democratic process. Yet these principles have been largely 
abandoned in practice by states in Europe, North America, 
and Australia. Th ey have been replaced by measures that 
aim to keep refugees and asylum seekers away from their 
borders.51 Th e post-WWII human rights-based regime of 
global governance, itself an expression of liberal democracy, 
has largely been supplanted by concepts like ‘human secur-
ity’, practiced as selective security, which I contend signals 
the geopoliticization of human life.
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